(WP 2010-05) Exchange-Rate Pass Through, Openness, and the Sacrifice Ratio by Daniels, Joseph P & VanHoose, David D
  
 
Department of Economics 
Working Paper 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
College of Business Administration 
 
 
 
 
Exchange-Rate Pass Through, Openness, and the 
Sacrifice Ratio 
 
By 
Joseph P. Daniels 
David D. VanHoose 
 
Working Paper 2010-05 
 
Exchange-Rate Pass Through, Openness, and the Sacrifice Ratio 
 
 
 
Joseph P. Daniels♦
Department of Economics 
 
Marquette University 
 
David D. VanHoose 
Hankamer School of Business,  
Baylor University 
 
Abstract 
 
Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about whether and how globalization 
affects the inflation-output trade-off and suggests that the ultimate effect of openness on the 
output-inflation relationship is influenced by a variety of factors.  In this paper, we consider the 
impact of exchange-rate pass through and how pass through conditions the effect of openness on 
the sacrifice ratio.  We develop a simple theoretical model showing how both the extent of pass 
through and openness can interact to influence the output-inflation relationship.  Next we 
empirically explore the nature of these two variables and their interaction. Results indicate that 
greater pass through increases the sacrifice ratio, that there is significant interaction among pass 
through and openness, and—once the extent of pass through is taken into account alongside 
other factors that affect the sacrifice ratio, such as central bank independence—openness exerts 
an empirically ambiguous effect on the sacrifice ratio.   
 
JEL Codes:  F40, F41, F43 
 
Keywords:  Exchange-Rate Pass Through, Openness, Sacrifice Ratio 
 
August 2010 
                                                 
♦ Corresponding author 
Email: joseph.daniels@marquette.edu 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/econ_workingpapers/5 
 1 
 
 
EXCHANGE-RATE PASS THROUGH, OPENNESS, INFLATION,  
AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 
 
1.  Introduction 
Does globalization affect inflation?  Romer (1993) found a negative cross-country 
relationship between inflation and the degree of openness to international trade.  This sparked a 
number of theoretical and empirical studies on how openness affects the inflation-output tradeoff 
and how this relationship is conditioned upon possible interactions of openness and other key 
aspects of the aggregate economy.   Romer suggests that greater openness to trade enhances 
negative terms-of-trade effects resulting from domestic output expansions, thereby reducing the 
incentive for a central bank to engage in inflationary policymaking, and Lane (1997) proposes 
that greater trade openness reduces the potential output gains from unexpected inflation in non-
traded-goods sectors characterized by imperfect competition and sticky product prices.  
Furthermore, Karras (1999) argues that greater indexation of nominal wages to unexpected 
inflation in response to increased trade openness could also reduce the incentive for central banks 
to inflate.   
The explanations provided by Romer, Lane, and Karras imply that the effects of openness 
on the inflation realizations operate by worsening the terms of the output-inflation trade-off 
faced by central banks.  Temple (2002), however, has suggested that there is little cross-country 
evidence that increased trade openness reduces the sacrifice ratio.  Daniels, Nourzad, and 
VanHoose (2005) propose that once the inflation-reducing impact of greater central bank 
independence is taken into account, there is evidence in cross-country data that increased trade 
openness actually increases the sacrifice ratio, a result consistent with Rogoff’s (2006) 
suggestion that increased globalization tends to make the Phillips curve shallower.  This result, 
Daniels and VanHoose (2006) argue, is consistent with a view that greater trade openness 
exposes imperfectly competitive firms to greater competition, thereby reducing their pricing 
power and effectively increasing the observed responsiveness of output to changes in the 
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inflation rate.  Recently, Badinger (2009) has obtained results consistent with this prediction in 
an analysis of data from 91 countries over the 1985-2004 interval. 
Nevertheless, Daniels and VanHoose also point out that the ultimate effects of increased 
trade openness on the sacrifice ratio hinge on a number of structural factors likely to vary across 
countries.  Along this same line, Neiss (2001) suggests that the effect of openness on inflation 
becomes more muted—indeed, empirically insignificant—once markups are taken into account.  
In addition, Bowdler (2009) finds that the relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio 
depends on the exchange-rate regime that is in place, and Cavelaars (2009) suggests that the 
nature of this relationship likely is influenced by trade costs.  Ball (2006) argues that for the 
United States there is in fact no clear evidence that globalization impinges on the process by 
which inflation is determined.1
A number of recent studies examine the varying degree of exchange-rate pass through 
among economies and changes in pass-through estimates over time.  Taylor (2000), for example, 
argues that changes in individual expectations regarding price-setting behavior has led to lower 
inflation and lower price margins, and, as a consequence, reduced pass through.  Gagnon and 
Ihrig (2004) maintain that a greater emphasis on inflation stabilization has led to both lower 
mean inflation and a reduced extent of pass through.  Based on cross-country panel estimates, 
Campa and Goldberg (2005) examine the main theoretical arguments explaining cross-country 
differences and changes over time in exchange-rate pass through.  They argue that inflation 
performance, nominal exchange-rate volatility, and other macroeconomic factors play an 
important but limited role in influencing cross-country differences in pass through. Campa and 
Goldberg find that changes in the composition of trade—specifically, a shift to a greater share of 
manufactures in a country’s import bundle—correlates with a lower extent of pass through.  
Marazzi et al. (2005) show that, in addition to the change in the composition of imports, the 
growing importance of Chinese trade may have reduced the extent of U.S. pass through.  They 
suggest that markets experiencing the greatest reductions in the extent of pass through are those 
in which China has recorded an increased market share.  At a macroeconomic level, Flamini 
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(2007) and Adolfson (2007) focuses on the design of optimal monetary policy and shows that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy can be conditioned upon the degree of exchange-rate pass 
through.  Hence, accounting for the degree of pass through can improve monetary policy and 
thereby reduce mean inflation.  
Our objective here is not to add to the debate on the microeconomic or macroeconomic 
determinants of the extent of exchange-rate pass through or regarding the optimal design of 
monetary policy in light of partial pass through.  Instead, this paper investigates the effect of 
exchange-rate pass through on the sacrifice ratio and the role that the extent of exchange-rate 
pass through has in influencing the relationship between the degree of openness to international 
trade and the output-inflation trade-off.  We begin by developing a simple theoretical model 
showing how both the extent of pass through and the degree of openness can affect the sacrifice 
ratio and how these two factors can also interact to influence the sacrifice ratio.  The model 
illustrates how both factors work through competing channels, which renders their overall 
impacts on the sacrifice ratio theoretically ambiguous.  The model also predicts that a greater 
extent of pass through either enhances a positive impact or reduces a negative effect of greater 
openness on the sacrifice ratio.  Finally, the model indicates that the overall impact of greater 
openness on the sacrifice ratio is likely to be indeterminate when considering the competing 
effects of key characteristics of the economy, including in particular the extent of exchange-rate 
pass through. 
 Using cross-country data spanning 20 countries for the period 1975 through 2004, we 
find that there is in fact evidence that the degree of pass through directly influences the sacrifice 
ratio and impinges on the impact of increased openness on the sacrifice ratio.  Specifically, a 
greater extent of pass through contributes to a higher sacrifice ratio and reduces the negative 
effect of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio. Additional estimates taking into account the 
extent of central bank independence indicate that the net effect of greater openness on the 
sacrifice ratio is ambiguous. 
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The following section provides a theoretical explanation for interdependence of the 
effects of a greater extent of pass through and an increased degree of openness on the output-
inflation relationship as measured by the sacrifice ratio.  Section 3 utilizes cross-country data on 
the extent of pass through, the degree of openness, and other variables relevant to the 
determination of sacrifice ratios to evaluate the empirical predictions forthcoming from our 
theoretical model.  Section 4 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2.  A Model of Interdependence among Pass Through, Openness, and the Sacrifice Ratio 
 The literature on discretionary policymaking suggests that a nation’s equilibrium inflation 
rate depends crucially on two key factors:  the preferences of its monetary authority in terms of 
relative weights on output versus inflation and the country’s output-inflation relationship faced 
by the monetary authority.  To examine the effects of a greater extent of pass through on a 
nation’s output-inflation relationship, we consider an adaptation of the model developed in 
Daniels and VanHoose (2006).  In the model, there are numerous atomistic sectors, indexed i.  
These sectors are distributed uniformly along a unit interval.  Each sector contains large numbers 
of workers and firms, the latter of which produce an identical good, which is differentiated from 
the goods produced in other sectors.  Following Ball (1988) and Duca and VanHoose (2000), we 
assume an identical price elasticity of demand across sectors for the sake of simplicity and 
tractability.  A portion, Ω, of firms have workforces that contractually set nominal wages in 
advance of labor-market clearing.  In the remaining fraction, 1-Ω, of firms, spot labor markets 
determine nominal wages.   
In our framework, the output produced by a given firm in sector i is  
 
 yi = αli ,                    (1) 
 
where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at a firm in sector i.  The demand for 
the output of a firm in sector i as a share of aggregate domestic output is  
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ε ( - ),i iy - y = - p p                 (2) 
  
where y ≡
1
0∫ iy di  is the log of aggregate domestic output; p ≡
1
0∫ ip di  is the log of the index of 
prices charged by domestic firms; andε  >1 is the price elasticity of demand. 
Domestic income is determined by the quantity equation,   
 
 y = m – p,                 (3) 
 
where m is the log of the money stock and the log of velocity has been normalized at a value of 
zero.  The domestic nation’s income-expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation of this 
Cobb-Douglas approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991, or Bryson, et. 
al., 1993) is given by 
 
 y = η (pM + s - p) + (1 - β )y + *β y*;              (4) 
 
where η  is the elasticity of desired spending with respect to the real exchange rate; β  and *β , 
which are fractions, are home and foreign propensities to import; pM is the log of the aggregate 
level of prices charged by foreign producers and invoiced in foreign prices; s is the log of the 
domestic currency price of foreign currency; and y* is the log of aggregate foreign output.   
We incorporate the extent of exchange-rate pass through into the model along the lines of 
Adolfson (2007).  We assume that the aggregate level of prices charged by foreign producers, 
measured in foreign currency units, pM, may deviate from the level of prices that would prevail 
with full pass through, which is an index of the prices charged by foreign firms invoiced in terms 
of the foreign currency, denoted p*.  If the extent of pass through is incomplete, however, 
producers respond to exchange-rate changes that lead to deviations between the foreign price and 
the price of the domestic good in foreign currency units.  In this latter situation, pM deviates from 
p*.  Let 1 - γ  denote the extent to which foreign producers adjust the price, in foreign currency 
units, that they charge in response to these deviations from the price of the domestic good due to 
changes in the nominal exchange rate, so that 
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γM *p - p = p - s(1 - )( ) .                (5) 
 
Thus, under full pass through, γ  = 1, and the foreign price is equal to p*, consistent with 
producer-currency pricing. With no pass through, γ  = 0, consistent with local-currency pricing.  
If we were to specify analogous structural relationships for a foreign nation, the result 
would be a two-country framework in which y* and p* would be treated as fully endogenous 
variables.  In order to concentrate on a basic open-economy setting with the potential for 
incomplete pass through, we assume that foreign output and the foreign price index are 
exogenous and equal to a normalized level of unity, so that y* and p* equal zero.  
 Using (1) in the profit function, PiYi – WiLi , yields the labor demand function for a firm i 
(with the intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent analysis): 
 
ε ηγ β
α ε αε
d
i
i  
 
w - p s p m - p
l =
+ -
( ) + (  - ) + (1 - )( )- 
  ,              (6) 
 
where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.   
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and foreign-produced goods.  
Consequently, labor supply to firms depends on the real wage computed in terms of the overall 
price workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods, where the consumer price 
index is β β(1 - ) + (  + )Mp p s and λ > 0 is the labor supply elasticity: 
 
[ ]λ βγ βγ= −si il w p s(1 - ) - .                (7) 
 
For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information, market-clearing 
wage satisfies (5) and (6) simultaneously and equals 
 
[ ]
λ α ε αε β η γ β
λ α ε αε ε
^
 i
s - p m - p
w =
+ - + ( ) + (1 - )( )
+ -
[  (  )  ]
 .
(  ) + 
 
 
 
            (8) 
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Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid in sector i if it is among the 
share, 1-Ω, of sectors without nominal wage contracts, depends positively on the extent of pass 
through.  Substitution of (8) into either (6) or (7) and the result into (1) yields output of a 
noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:   
 
[ ]
η βε γ β
αλ
λ α ε αε ε
− 
 
 
mc
 i
s - p m - p
y =
( ) ( ) + (1 - )( )
 
( + - ) + 
 
 .
 
            (9) 
 
Thus, output of firms in sectors without wage contracts responds ambiguously to an increased 
degree of pass through.  This ambiguity can be understood by considering the direct and indirect 
effects of variations in the extent of pass through.  The direct effect of a greater extent of pass 
through occurs via an increase in consumer price inflation as a consequence of higher prices of 
imported goods.  The indirect effect of an enlarged degree of pass through takes place via a 
change in the real exchange rate, which affects domestic output by altering relative prices.  In 
equation (9), a greater extent of pass through increases the magnitude ofγ  and thereby raises the 
demand for domestic output and thus non-contracting firms’ demand for labor.  Hence, the 
indirect effect of an increased degree of pass through is a positive dependence of output on the 
magnitude ofγ  operating through theη coefficient in the first term of the numerator of the ratio 
within parentheses in (9).  At the same time, however, an increase in the extent of the direct 
effect of pass through boosts the level of prices of imported foreign goods, which raises the 
consumer price index, induces a decline in labor supply, and thereby tends to reduce employment 
and output in sectors with market-clearing wages.  Thus, the direct effect results in a contrasting 
negative dependence on the magnitude ofγ .  This effect operates through the βε  coefficient in 
the first term of the numerator of the ratio within parentheses in (9).  On net, therefore, the 
impact of a larger degree of pass through on output of non-contracting firms is indeterminate. 
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, Ω, of firms in sectors with nominal wage 
contracts, the contract wage is equal to the expected value of the market clearing wage, 
e
i
^
c
iw  = w .  
Hence, from (6) and (1), the output of a firm with wage contracts is 
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αε ηγ α β
α ε αε
e^
ic
 i
w - p s - p m - p
y = 
- ( ) + ( ) + (1 - )( )
( + - )
 .
 
          (10) 
 
Because wages are fixed in this sector, pass through affects output only through the indirect, 
real-exchange-rate channel, through which output at firms with wage contracts unambiguously 
responds positively to an increased extent of pass through.  The demand for output of domestic 
firms depends positively on the real exchange rate; that is, in logs, an increase in the differential 
between the exchange-rate-adjusted index of prices charged in domestic markets by foreign firms 
and the index of domestic firms’ prices pushes up the demand for domestic output. 
Consequently, a greater degree of pass through boosts the real exchange rate and raises the 
derived demand for labor by domestic firms.  With nominal wages set by contracts, the result is a 
rise in domestic employment and hence domestic output. 
 Firms behave identically, so that  c ciy  = y for all i ∈ [0, Ω],  
mc mc
iy  = y for all i ∈  (Ω, 1].  
It follows that y = Ω yc + (1-Ω)ymc.  Substituting from (8) and (9) and differentiating with respect 
to the index of domestic firms’ prices yields 
 
[ ]{ } [ ]
(p
Ω α ε β αηγ Ω λα βε η γ β
α ε αε λ α ε αε ε
∂
=
∂ + − + −
-y (1- ) - (1- ) ( - ) - (1- )+
) +
.        (11) 
 
Under imperfect competition, there are no firm-level supply curves and no aggregate supply 
relationship.  Consequently, the expression in (11) is the slope of the relationship between the 
aggregate output of profit-maximizing price-setting firms and the overall level of prices set by 
these firms.  If markets are sufficiently non-competitive, it is feasible for this slope to be 
negative, because profit-maximizing firms with considerable monopoly power seek to restrain 
output substantially in order to boost prices.  Hence, computed solely with respect to an increase 
in the index of domestic firms’ prices, the domestic sacrifice ratio is positive for a sufficiently 
large value ofε —that is, if the degree of competition is sufficiently high.    
 9 
 
 
Differentiating (11) with respect to β  yields 
(
Ω αλ εγΩα
β α ε αε λ α ε αε ε
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ + − + −
( / ) (1 - ) ( + 1)= +  > 0.
) +
y p
 Thus, as in Daniels and VanHoose (2006), one 
prediction forthcoming from this model is that, with respect to the index of domestic firms’ 
prices, an increase in the extent to which the nation’s economy is open to international trade 
boosts the sacrifice ratio.  This is so because greater openness renders desired expenditures on 
domestic output less sensitive to variations in aggregate domestic income, which makes each 
firm’s profit-maximizing price less responsive to a change in aggregate domestic output.  As a 
consequence, in a more open economy, greater variations in output will be observed for given 
variations in the index of prices charged by domestic firms. 
Differentiating (11) with respect toγ  yields 
[ ]( (Ω λ α ε αε βε λ α ε αε Ωε η
α
γ α ε αε
 + − + −∂ ∂ ∂
  ∂ + − 
(1 - ) ) ) +( / )
=  
-y p
, the sign of which is 
indeterminate.  Note that in this expression, if Ω  =1, so that all sectors of the economy utilize 
nominal wage contracts, 
γ
∂ ∂ ∂
∂
( / )y p
< 0 follows unambiguously.  In this special case, a greater 
extent of pass through makes the index of prices charged in domestic markets by foreign firms 
less sensitive to variations in the real exchange rate brought about by changes in prices charged 
by domestic firms, which makes the demand for domestic output less sensitive to variations in 
the index of domestic firms’ prices.  Thus, a larger degree of pass through reduces the sacrifice 
ratio in an all-contracting economy.  In the more general case in which 0 <Ω  < 1, however, the 
previously discussed conflicting effects of increased pass through on outputs of firms in non-
contracting sectors influences the overall responsiveness of domestic output to an increase in the 
index of domestic firms’ prices.  As a consequence, in an economy made up of both sectors with 
nominal wage contracts and sectors with market-clearing wages, the theoretically predicted 
effect of an increased degree of pass through on the sacrifice ratio is ambiguous.  Only empirical 
analysis could determine whether the net effect is positive or negative. 
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In addition, 
(
β Ω αλε
γ λ α ε αε ε
∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂  ∂ 
∂ + −
( / )
(1 - )=  > 0.
) +
y p
  A greater extent of pass through 
further stimulates inflation-induced production in market-clearing sectors.  A rise in γ  boosts the 
direct effect operating through the βε  coefficient in the output expressions for output of market-
clearing firms in (9) that was noted above, thus enhancing the impact that greater openness has 
on prices charged by domestic firms and their effects on domestic output.  Thus, an enlarged 
degree of pass through enhances the positive effect of a greater degree of openness the sacrifice 
ratio.   
 Sacrifice ratios examined by Ball (1994) and other authors typically are computed using 
CPI inflation rates, which incorporate effects of exchange-rate variations as well as changes in 
the index of prices of domestic firms.  Thus, sacrifice ratios also typically reflect variations in 
real exchange rates as well.  From (9) and (10), differentiating aggregate output with respect to 
the exchange rate yields 
 
(s
Ωαηγ Ω λα βε η γ
α ε αε λ α ε αε ε
∂
= −
∂ + − + −
y (1- ) ( - )
) +
.           (12) 
 
This expression is ambiguous in sign but is more likely to be negative for a sufficiently large 
value ofε , because under this condition the predominant effect of domestic currency 
depreciation is to reduce the real wage rate and hence reduce labor supply and output.  Note that 
the effect of greater openness on the output impact of the exchange rate is given by 
(
s Ω αλεγ
β λ α ε αε ε
∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂ + −
y( / ) (1- )=  < 0.
) +
  Consequently, in contrast to the positive impact that a 
greater degree of trade openness has on the sacrifice ratio via the domestic price channel, 
increased openness has a negative effect on the sacrifice ratio via the real-exchange-rate channel, 
and this negative impact of openness is enlarged with a greater extent of pass-through (a higher 
value of γ). 
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 Could the negative effect of greater openness generated through the domestic real-
currency-depreciation channel more than offset the positive openness effect operating through an 
increase in the index of prices at domestic firms?  Potentially, the answer is yes.  If exchange-
rate overshooting is commonplace, for example, then a rise in the nominal exchange rate could 
exceed an increase in the domestic price index.  If the degree of overshooting is regularly 
sufficiently large, then the net effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio could be negative—if the 
degree of pass through is also sufficiently large.  
To summarize, the impacts of both an increased degree of openness and a greater extent 
of exchange-rate pass through on the sacrifice ratio operate through opposing direct and indirect 
channels.  The direct, domestic-price channel yields a positive impact on the sacrifice ratio, and 
the indirect, real-exchange-rate channel yields a negative sacrifice-ratio effect.   Of course, on 
net the overall effects of an increased degree of openness and a greater extent of pass through 
operating via both channels simultaneously is ambiguous.  Furthermore, the overall effect of 
greater trade openness is conditioned on interactions among the degree of openness and other 
key characteristics of the economy, in particular the extent of exchange-rate pass through.  The 
theoretical importance of accounting for such interactions may help to explain why Daniels et al. 
(2005) and Bowdler (2009)—who fail to consider a role for the extent of pass through—reach 
opposing conclusions on the effects of a greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio.  Thus, 
our empirical work that follows seeks to take into account interactions among all of these 
variables.  
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4.  Empirical Evidence on Pass Through, Openness, and the Sacrifice Ratio 
The key empirical implications of our theoretical model are as follows: 
  i)   the predicted effect of a greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio is theoretically 
ambiguous and can only be determined empirically; 
ii)    the predicted impact of a greater extent of exchange-rate pass through on the sacrifice ratio 
is theoretically ambiguous and can only be determined empirically; 
 iii)  if the effect of a greater extent of pass through is empirically significant, an increased extent 
of pass through enhances (reduces) a positive (negative) effect of openness on the sacrifice 
ratio;  
iv)   the overall effect of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio depends on key structural 
characteristics of the economy, such as the extent of exchange-rate pass through, and when 
these competing effects are considered simultaneously, the overall impact of openness is 
likely to be indeterminate. 
We begin the empirical analysis with the estimates of the sacrifice ratio from Bowdler 
(2009).  These estimates cover the period 1981 through 1998.  We extend the data in both 
directions, estimating the sacrifice ratio from 1975 through 2004.  These estimates are consistent 
with Bowdler (and hence the process of Ball 1994) and are likewise based on data from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.2  Trend inflation is measured 
as average inflation over eight quarters, centered on a given year, so that trend inflation for year t 
is the average over the last two quarters of year t-1 through the first two quarters of t+1.  A 
disinflation period is defined as a period in which trend inflation declines by more than 1.5 
percent from a peak to a trough. The initial level of inflation is measured at the peak and labeled 
Inflation in the following data tables. The change in inflation from the peak to the trough is 
labeled ΔInflation. The length of each disinflationary period (Length) is measured in years. The 
sacrifice ratio, SAC, is the ratio of the reduction trend output to the associated change in trend 
inflation for a given disinflationary period. These calculations are made for 20 advanced 
economies resulting in 69 observations. 
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We augment this data with a measure of the degree of trade openness, Openness.  We 
follow the literature by measuring the degree of openness as the average of the annual ratio of 
imports to GDP over the entire sample period.  This measure is taken from the World 
Development Indicators.  For the reasons spelled out by Daniels et al. (2005), we also include 
their measure of central bank independence, CBI, derived from Franzese (2002).  A measure of 
the duration of wage contracts, WDUR, is taken from Temple (2002), whose original source is 
Bruno and Sachs (1985).  Lastly, we include Campa and Goldberg’s (2005) estimates of the 
extent of nominal exchange-rate pass through, Pass Through, elasticity spanning the period 
1975 through 2003. We use this measure because, as Campa and Goldberg argue, their elasticity 
measure has a direct economic interpretation and is the most relevant measure of the impact of 
exchange rate changes on inflation performance.  Specifically, their estimates reflect the impact 
of a one-percent fluctuation of the nominal exchange rate on import prices, which correspond to 
prices denoted pM in the theoretical model presented in the previous section.  Hence, a pass-
through estimate of 0.62 (the mean value in our sample of countries) implies that a one percent 
depreciation of the domestic currency would result in a 0.62 percent increase in the import price 
index of the domestic country.  The authors provide both short-run estimates (quarterly pass 
through) and long-run estimates (annual pass through).  We use the latter, because it is consistent 
with our annual estimates of trend inflation and the sacrifice ratio.  Note that the measures of the 
degree of openness, the level of central bank independence, wage duration, and the extent of pass 
through are all time invariant. All regression models are ordinary least squares with the various 
corrections and controls listed below.  Descriptive statistics and the countries used in the data set 
are provided in Table 1. 
Due to the number of observations and the nature of the data set, Daniels et al., and 
Bowdler suggest testing for potential outliers. Therefore, we first test for outliers, running a 
regression with the sacrifice ratio as the dependent variable and Inflation, ΔInflation, Length, 
CBI, Openness, and a constant as regressors. We use the DFITS statistics as our criterion for the 
detection of outliers and, following Maddala (2001), control for the influence of outliers using 
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bounded influence estimation.  This approach weights potential outliers by creating a single 
variable in which all observations whose DFITS statistics is less than or equal to 0.34 are coded 
as one and all observations whose DFITS statistic is greater than 0.34 are coded with the value of 
0.34 divided by the absolute value of their DFTIS statistic.  
The Breusch-Pagen / Cook-Weisberg test is used to test for heteroskedasticity, and rejects 
the null hypothesis of constant variance. Hence, all of the subsequent regression models report 
robust standard errors. Furthermore, following Caporale and Caporale (2008), we also control for 
the clustering of error terms at the country level.  
 Regression Model 1 in Table 2 is a base model that includes standard determinants of the 
sacrifice ratio; Inflation, ΔInflation, Length, CBI, and Openness.  As in Bowdler, the length of 
the disinflationary period remains a key determinant of the sacrifice ratio. There are, however, 
important differences. First, the coefficient estimate for CBI is, consistent with Daniels et al. 
(2005), positive and significant.  Additionally, Bowdler reports “weak” evidence linking the 
change in inflation to the SAC, whereas our results are significant at the 1 percent level. More 
importantly, Bowdler also reports a weak negative correlation between openness and the SAC, 
whereas our results are significant at the 5 percent level.  These differences are likely an outcome 
of the larger data set (a longer time horizon in both directions) that we employ.  Recall that the 
results of the theoretical model imply that a negative effect of greater openness on the sacrifice 
ratio results if the indirect, longer-term effect operating through the real-exchange-rate channel 
predominates over the direct, shorter-term positive impact operating through the domestic-price 
channel.  These results are suggestive of an interpretation that—in the context of the more recent 
data explored here and by Bowdler—the real-exchange-rate exchange rate channel has become 
empirically more important over time.  
Although our main interest is how pass through might condition the impact of openness 
on the sacrifice ratio, Model 2 drops Openness and adds the Pass Through variable to the base 
model to consider a potential independent effect.   In Model 2, the coefficient estimate for Pass 
Through is positive and statistically significant at the 6 percent level.  Further, its inclusion has 
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little impact on the sign and significance of the other model variables.  This result suggests that 
countries with a greater degree of exchange-rate pass through tend to have a larger sacrifice ratio, 
consistent with the effects of variations in the extent of pass through operating primarily through 
the direct, domestic-price channel. Model 3 includes both Openness and Pass Through. The 
inclusion of both variables lowers the p-value of Openness to 1 percent and the p-value of Pass 
Through to 4.5 percent. The estimates of this model suggest that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the Openness measure results in a 0.37 decrease in the SAC, whereas a one-standard-
deviation increase in the Pass Through measure results in a 0.27 increase in the SAC. These 
individual effects of Openness and Pass Through on the SAC are illustrated in added-variable 
plots in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 plots the residuals of a regression of Openness (as the 
dependent variable) on all other model variables against the residuals of a regression of the SAC 
(as the dependent variable) on all other variables except Openness, thereby isolating the impact 
of Openness on the SAC.  Figure 2 provides the corresponding plot for Pass Through.   
Model 4 includes an interaction term between Pass Through and Openness.  Our theory 
suggests that a greater extent of exchange-rate pass through enhances an output expansion 
generated by a higher price level in nominal-wage-contracting sectors, boosting the positive 
impact of a greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio via the direct channel.3  Consistent 
with this theoretical prediction, the estimated coefficient on this interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant.  Note that the estimated total marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice 
ratio in Model 4 is the sum of the coefficient on Openness plus the coefficient on the Openness-
Pass Through interaction term times a given value for Pass Through.  Evaluated at the mean 
value for Pass Through, the total estimated marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice ratio 
remains negative and statistically significant. Figure 3 illustrates the total marginal effect of 
Openness on the SAC, taking into account the interaction with Pass Through. Figure 3 also 
includes the point estimates for each individual country given in light of each nation’s unique 
measure of Pass Through (plotted on the right-hand axis), along with a histogram of the Pass 
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Through measures (plotted on the left-hand axis). For reference purposes, the individual 
marginal effect of Openness on the SAC is illustrated by the solid horizontal line. 
Model 5 drops the interaction of Pass Through and Openness and controls for a potential 
interplay between CBI and Openness, as suggested by Daniels et al.  Once this interaction is 
taken into account, the coefficient estimate for Openness is no longer statistically significant.  
This finding is consistent with the more recent results of Bowdler as well as the theoretical 
model presented here.4
Though not considered in the theoretical model, Model 6 drops the interaction of Pass 
Through and Openness and controls for a potential interaction between CBI and Pass Through.  
Daniels et al. (2005) suggest that greater CBI leads to greater nominal wage contracting and, 
therefore, a larger sacrifice ratio.  Greater CBI and greater nominal wage contracting would also 
leave less scope for exchange-rate pass through to independently exert a positive influence on the 
sacrifice ratio. This conclusion suggests a negative coefficient estimate for the CBI-Pass 
Through interaction term.  The estimate of the interaction term is indeed negative and 
statistically significant, providing some empirical support for this argument.   
  Models 3 and 4 suggest that the overall impact of openness on the 
sacrifice ratio depends on interacting structural parameters of the macroeconomy.  Once the full 
scope of such interactions is taken into account, the impact of Openness on the sacrifice ratio 
becomes ambiguous.   
In addition to the empirical models summarized in Table 2, we also examined the role of 
wage contracting by considering a model that includes the wage duration measure described 
above (WDUR) and interactions of that measure with the Pass Through measure.  The 
coefficient on the wage duration variable in this revised model turns out to be positive but not 
statistically significant, and the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant.  The only 
impact of including the wage duration in the model is to reduce the level of significance for the 
Pass Through measure (the p-value for this revised model turns out to be slightly outside 
standard levels of significance for a two-tailed test).  Including the wage duration measure (from 
Temple 2002), which exhibits little variation across the sample of countries and does not cover 
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the full sample of countries (omitting Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain), reduces the sample 
size to 55 observations.  Hence, we do not take our results as indicating that there is no 
interaction with the extent of pass through or other key structural characteristics and the degree 
of wage contracting.  Rather, we see further study of the importance of the degree of nominal 
wage rigidity as a conditioning factor to be a potentially important path for future research.  
 A model that omitted potential outliers was also considered by using a standard threshold 
for the DFITS statistic of 2 times the square root the number of independent variables (k) divided 
by the number of observations (n), 2·(k/n). Based on this threshold, we identify two outliers, 
Finland (1989-1996, also identified as an outlier by Bowdler), and Italy (1977-1978, which was 
not included in Bowdler’s sample).  For these two observations, Finland had an exceptionally 
large sacrifice ratio (10.529, which is more than two standard deviations greater than the mean), 
and Italy exhibited a very large drop in inflation of 13.57 percent over only a one-year 
disinflationary period.  These results are provided in Table 3 which indicates that standard 
measures of model fit were lower under this approach and that there were no noteworthy 
differences in the sign and significance of our variables of interest.  
Finally, Bowdler suggests the impact of the degree of openness and its interaction with 
the level of central bank independence may have changed along with monetary-policy making 
after 1980.  In light of this suggestion, we also introduced a single dummy variable to evaluate 
the effect of our inclusion of the earlier sample period, coding years 1975 through 1980 as one 
and all subsequent years as zero.  The coefficient estimate for this variable was statistically 
insignificant, and its presence had no impact (other than to reduce the p-value on both Openness 
and Pass Through) on our general conclusions.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about whether and how 
globalization affects the output-inflation relationship.  In this paper, we have explored the 
implications of a simple theoretical model allowing for the variations in extent of exchange-rate 
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pass through and the degree of trade openness to exert simultaneous impacts on the output-
inflation trade-off.  This model predicts that both factors should have interacting effects on the 
sacrifice ratio.  Examination of the interaction among measures of the degree of openness, the 
extent of pass through, the level of central bank independence, and other factors influencing the 
sacrifice ratio in cross-country data verifies the empirical importance of the predicted 
interactions.  On net, our results indicate that a greater extent of pass through increases the 
sacrifice ratio.  Furthermore, once the extent of pass through is taken into account alongside 
other factors that affect the sacrifice ratio, the degree of openness to international trade tends to 
have an empirically indeterminate effect on the sacrifice ratio.   
Thus, our results suggest that considerable work must be done to better understand 
whether and how greater openness influences the output-inflation relationship.  In light of the 
numerous structural factors that can impinge on the potential relationship between the degree of 
openness and the sacrifice ratio, it may be appropriate for future studies of this relationship to 
focus attention on evidence revealed from time-series data from individual countries instead of 
cross-country data. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics for 20 Countries, 1975-2004a 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
SAC 1.417 1.836 -1.851 10.529 69 
Inflation 9.986 5.964 1.271 27.586 69 
ΔInflation 6.158 4.232 1.529 17.995 69 
Length 4.464 1.960 1 11 69 
Openness 31.308 14.088 10.08 65.61 69 
CBI 0.453 0.196 0.150 0.931 69 
WDUR 1.382 0.782 0 2 55 
Pass Through 0.617 0.314 0.06 1.13 69 
a Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.  
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Table 2 
Sacrifice Ratio Estimates for 20 Countries, 1975-2004a 
Bounded Influence Estimation 
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
             
Length 0.6915*** 0.6587*** 0.6654*** 0.6599*** 0.6633*** 0.6643*** 
  0.1008 0.0910 0.0964 0.1063 0.0971 0.0969 
Inflation 0.0409 0.0381 0.0361 0.0267 0.0295 0.0305 
  0.0343 0.0307 0.0346 0.0375 0.0349 0.0360 
ΔInflation -0.2233*** -0.2134*** -0.2150*** -0.2027** -0.2074*** -0.2087*** 
  0.0663 0.0581 0.0636 0.0720 -0.0645 0.0651 
CBI 1.4726** 1.4738** 1.4294** 1.3965** 3.6094** 2.8324*** 
  0.5732 0.5972 0.5196 0.5455 1.5627 0.6522 
Openness -0.0314**  -0.0266*** -0.0582*** 0.0094 -0.0267** 
  0.0125  0.0091 0.0119 0.0276 0.0094 
Pass Through   1.1704* 0.8657** -0.9089 0.9090** 1.7919*** 
    0.5961 0.4031 0.5604 0.4241 0.4510 
PT·Openness     0.0538***    
      0.0164    
CBI·Openness     -0.0758  
     0.0548  
CBI·PT       -2.1474** 
        0.8515 
Constant 5.7812*** 4.1804** 5.4072*** 6.7422*** 4.4495*** 4.8563*** 
  1.6020 1.5421 1.4850 1.7476 1.4111 1.4206 
          
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.6768 0.6581 0.6965 0.7164 0.7004 0.7013 
R-Bar 0.6455 0.6250 0.6617 0.6786 0.6605 0.6615 
F 14.63 13.59 12.72 16.93 11.39 12.23 
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level, for two-tailed test. 
a All models control for clustering at the country level. 
 24 
 
 
Table 3 
Sacrifice Ratio Estimates for 20 Countries, 1975-2004a 
Omitted Outliers Estimation 
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
             
Length 0.6286*** 0.6233*** 0.6177*** 0.6089*** 0.6177*** 0.6177*** 
  0.1228 0.1282 0.1223 0.1259 0.1240 0.1222 
Inflation 0.0626 0.0659 0.0611 0.0548 0.0610 0.0572 
  0.0510 0.0531 0.0519 0.0544 0.0538 0.0538 
dInflation -0.1948* -0.1995* -0.1921* -0.1813 -0.1920* -0.1878* 
  0.1003 0.1016 0.1011 0.1059 0.1039 0.1025 
CBI 1.0491* 1.0748* 1.0233* 0.9942* 1.0761 2.1175*** 
  0.5391 0.5257 0.4932 0.5273 1.4167 0.2943 
Openness -0.0205***  -0.1760*** -0.0322*** -0.0167 -0.0176*** 
  0.0059  0.005 0.0074 0.0242 0.0051 
PassThrough  0.6988** 0.4849** -0.3380 0.4859** 1.2070*** 
   0.3015 0.2299 0.4514 0.2301 0.3212 
PT·Openness    0.0247**    
     -0.0099    
CBI·Openness     -1.1435   
      0.8151   
CBI·PT      -1.6749** 
       -0.5894 
Constant -0.7854 -1.8568*** -1.1178* -0.5502  -1.5738*** 
  0.6074 0.6118 0.6110 0.7768 -1.1436 0.4577 
      0.8151   
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 
R-squared 0.4698 0.4530 0.4797 0.4863 0.4797 0.4843 
R-Bar 0.4254 0.4082 0.4180 0.4254 0.4709 0.4231 
F 21.34 13.52 15.37 28.81 17.75 33.71 
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level, for two-tailed test. 
a All models control for clustering at the country level and omit Finland (1989-1996) and Italy (1977-1978) 
as outliers. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Another branch of the literature exploring the relationship among globalization, output-
inflation trade-offs, and inflation focuses on the impact of increased capital mobility.  Recent 
examples of work in this area include Gruben and McLeod (2002, 2004), Razin and Yuen 
(2002), Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001), and Razin and Loungani (2005).  The extent to 
which trade openness and capital mobility exert independent effects on the output-inflation 
trade-off and inflation has been examined in recent work by Badinger (Forthcoming) and 
Daniels and VanHoose (Forthcoming). 
2 Sacrifice ratio data is available from the authors upon request. 
3 In this model the total marginal effect of Pass Through is the sum of the coefficient on Pass 
Through plus the coefficient on the interaction term times a given level of Openness. At the 
mean value of openness and the mean value plus one standard deviation, the total marginal 
effect of pass through is positive and statistically significant. At the mean value for Openness 
minus one standard deviation, the total marginal effect of Pass Through is positive but not 
statistically significant. For countries with relatively low levels of Openness (slightly more than 
the mean minus one standard deviation), the total marginal effect of pass through on the 
sacrifice ratio turns negative. 
4 In this model, the total marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice ratio is the sum of the 
coefficient on Openness plus the coefficient on the interaction term times a given value of CBI. 
Evaluated at the mean value for CBI and the mean value plus one standard deviation, the total 
impact of openness is negative and statistically significant. At the mean value for CBI minus one 
standard deviation, the total marginal effect of Openness is negative but not statistically 
significant. 
